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On 10 April 2019, the Event Horizon Telescope collaboration announced that 
it had made ‘paradigm-shifting observations of the gargantuan black hole 
at the heart of distant galaxy Messier 87’.1 The Event Horizon Telescope 
(EHT) is an array of eight ground-based radio telescopes, bringing together 
13 research institutes around the globe.  
While astronomy has always been an observational science, it is striking 
that the EHT collaboration, in its public presentations and press releases, 
describes its achievements in terms of the production a single image, albeit 
of an unprecedented sensitivity and resolution: rather than in terms of its 
ability to test the theories that describe physics at the event horizon. EHT’s 
public communications clearly present the image of the black hole as the 
collaboration’s primary result. The more detailed physical questions that the 
image makes it possible to answer, and which constitute EHT’s scientific 
aim, get, in such presentations, a second place.2  
 
1 Event Horizon Telescope press release, https://eventhorizontelescope.org/press-release-april-10-2019-
astronomers-capture-first-image-black-hole. 
2 The scientific papers published by the collaboration do mention the testing of various general relativity effects 
at horizon scales as the main scientific goal of the EHT array (EHT Collaboration, 2019a, p. 2). Nevertheless, out 
of the six papers published by the collaboration around the April 2019 announcement, four papers discuss, 
respectively, the image, the instrument, the data reduction, and the M87 shadow (EHT Collaboration, 2019-
2019c). Only two papers discuss the theoretical models and the black hole mass estimate (2019d-e).  
This primacy of the image in scientific communication raises several 
important questions: not only about the cognitive content of images in 
science, but also about the high value that scientists ostensibly ascribe to 
imaging.  
Nicola Möβner’s book Visual Representations in Science: Concept and 
Epistemology is a systematic analysis of the nature of visualisation in 
science, and of its epistemic import. Its contribution to these discussions is 
highly relevant and well-informed. 
I would like to summarise the book by four questions, each of which 
contains multiple possible ramifications:  
(1) What are scientific visualisations?  
(2) What justifies scientists’ reliance on visual information, in particular 
contexts, i.e. not only in the context of research, but also in the 
context of communication with scientists in other fields, and with the 
general public?  
(3) What kind of knowledge can we gain from visual representations? 
Does this include conceptual and-or propositional knowledge? 
(4) Can the knowledge that we obtain from visual representations be 
reduced to linguistically expressed knowledge? 
This is a thoroughly argued and researched monograph. No topic required 
to address these questions is left undiscussed. Thus the book treats the 
reader to a wide journey across a vast philosophical landscape. Despite its 
density, I found the reading both rewarding and informative—as I hope to 
show in the next Section. Section 2 offers a critique. 
Möβner’s monograph is a timely call to philosophers to give thought to the 
(in her opinion, neglected) topic of visual representations and their 
epistemic import. She stresses that philosophers have traditionally 
regarded argumentation as a logical and linguistic matter. On this view, 
visual representations can only function as arguments in so far as they are, 
or at least can be, expressed linguistically. Already Plato (1997, 597d-598c) 
called the painter an imitator of appearances rather than truth, lacking the 
craftsman’s knowledge. And Frege (1956, pp. 291-292) famously wrote that 
‘what is improperly called the truth of pictures is reduced to the truth of 
sentences’, thus reducing image to language. 
Möβner carefully navigates a number of recent philosophical debates that 
bear on these questions, thereby arguing for, and developing her own, 
balanced position. The exercise demonstrates how the apparently narrow 
topic of scientific visualisation can be an invitation to, at least, question 
some basic presuppositions in contemporary epistemology.  
1. Content of the monograph 
After a brief introduction, Chapter 2 focusses on question (1) above, i.e. on 
the nature of scientific visualisations. 
First, Möβner describes the extension of the term ‘scientific visualisation’. 
She describes four paradigmatic cases of visualisation in science: namely, 
photographs, imaging techniques (e.g. X-rays and functional magnetic 
resonance imaging or fMRI), data visualisations (e.g. visualisations of the 
Higgs particle), and diagrams (including graphs and drawings).  
To adequately describe the characteristics of these types of visualisation, it 
is important to regard them as artefacts: in particular, one should take into 
account that these visualisations have been purposefully brought about to 
store and-or to transmit information. She returns to this theme in Chapter 
3. 
She discusses this ‘informativeness’ of visual representations about their 
object of depiction using Woodward’s interventionist account of causation. 
The use of this account has two main problems: (1) Observability is a matter 
of degree: and so, visual representations cannot always be used to make 
direct inferences about an object. In many cases, they are mere indicators 
of the properties of the object. (2) The context of usage plays a major role 
in ascribing meaning to an image—and her agreeing with this thesis leads 
in to her distinction of different contexts, in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Second, Möβner describes the intension of scientific representation: in 
particular, the nature of depiction. She does this by reviewing five types of 
picture theories, where pictures are defined as entities that depict (i.e. 
represent visually or pictorially) one or more objects or states of affairs. The 
question that these theories attempt to answer is: in virtue of what do 
pictures depict? 
Thus Möβner summarises five theories: (a) resemblance theories (i.e. 
pictures depict in virtue of their resembling the subject matter, as e.g. in 
Plato and Peirce); (b) conventionalism (developed by Nelson Goodman: 
here, conventions are the result of negotiations, within a group, about how 
to visually represent particular entities); (c) experience-based theories (i.e. 
visual representations occasion a particular kind of visual experience); (d) 
recognition theories (i.e. a picture has the capacity to engage appropriate 
visual recognitional abilities); and (e) mixed theories. In mixed theories, 
pictures have a certain ‘two-foldness’: the pictorial ‘seeing-in’ involves the 
veridical experience of seeing the picture surface, and the non-veridical 
experience of seeing the depicted subject.  
Möβner discusses the constraints that such picture theories must satisfy in 
order to explain how information is encoded and decoded. Mixed theories 
fit the bill best. 
Thus, understanding an image—a specific type of artefact—implies grasping 
two meanings: the image’s content and the user’s intentions when using 
the image for communicative purposes. 
Chapter 3 is about the functional roles of visual representations, and it 
answers question (2) above. Since visual representations are artefacts, the 
starting point is an analysis of the use of visual representations in science 
as communicative acts in which scientists bear in mind both the purpose of 
the visualisation and their target audience. With respect to the audience, 
there are two uses of visual representations (which she also calls the 
‘contexts’ of the communicative act):  
(i) an exploratory use: in the genuine research activities; and  
(ii) an explanatory use: in the communication to peers, laymen, and 
in education.  
In these two contexts, the visualisations in question do not relate the same 
relata: namely, in the first context, the visualisation makes the object of 
research epistemically accessible to scientists, while in the second it 
communicates the scientist’s intended interpretation of that research 
object.  
The natural question is then (2)—What justifies scientists’ reliance on visual 
information? Here, two sorts of reasons can be used: 
(a) Causality and informativeness: i.e. the scientists’ background 
knowledge about the instrument’s causal connection to the object of 
research, about its calibration, and about the relevant mapping 
function that explains how the image resembles the depicted entity. 
(b) Trust and reputation: in particular, the use of visual representations 
is embedded in the epistemic practice of testimony. However, the 
reasons that justify taking visual representations as evidence of 
course go beyond mere trust. The speaker’s intention, reputation, and 
professional ethics are also important.  
The second point above leads in to considerations of social epistemology. 
Following Fleck, Möβner distinguishes between a thought collective (i.e. the 
people involved in a conversation) and a thought style (the collective’s 
unifying element). Fleck’s jargon can be used to describe the diversity of 
scientific images. Möβner distinguishes different types of communication: 
intra-collective and inter-collective communication, which is mirrored by a 
variety of kinds of science: popular, textbook, handbook, and journal 
science. All of these have different aims and modes of scientific 
communication, which Möβner discusses. 
Chapter 4 addresses questions (3) and (4) above, i.e. about the kind of 
knowledge that can be gained from visual representations, and whether this 
can be reduced to linguistically expressed knowledge. 
The possibility of visual information is based on the human capacity of visual 
perception, as our primary sense. However, while perception is thought to 
be an admissible source of knowledge in scientific observations and 
experiments, it is questioned in the context of scientific arguments. One 
problem is that, in many instances, visualisations need to be interpreted, in 
order to correctly understand their content.  
The bone of contention in this debate is whether the information transmitted 
by visual representations is propositional. For epistemologists understand 
‘knowledge’ primarily as ‘knowing-that’, i.e. as propositional knowledge. 
Möβner argues that it seems unlikely that scientists would lay such 
emphasis on visual representations if the latter were useless in the 
epistemic context of argumentation, i.e. if visual representations were 
unable to transmit propositional information.  
But from the fact that visual content can be, at least in part, translated from 
one form to another, e.g. from a visual to a linguistic representation, it 
follows that visual representations can contain cognitively accessible 
content. 
Furthermore, by embedding visual representations in communication, they 
can also be directly regarded as (parts of) assertions, without the need for 
a translation.  
Debate then ensues about whether visual representations can themselves 
have truth values. Some authors argue that visual representations are truth 
makers, and not truth bearers. Others point out that e.g. micrographs 
represent states of affairs: and, since truth values are connected to states 
of affairs, there is a criterion of evaluation—hence truth values. 
Furthermore, at least some visualisations function as models, and so they 
make claims that can be true or false: they are epistemically relevant. 
Möβner points to the example of abortion debates, where the contending 
parties use visual representations as arguments: and so, images can refute 
each other.  
Although there is among philosophers no consensus about the nature of 
perceptual content—whether it is propositional or non-propositional—
perception is generally seen to be an epistemic source: thus, to the question 
‘How do you know that p?’, it is admissible to reply: ‘Because I saw that p’.  
But if at least some visual information is translatable into language, perhaps 
all visual information is reducible to linguistically expressed information?  
Möβner develops arguments that should give one some pause here. First, 
human observers are able to receive perceptual information even in cases 
in which they lack the concepts required to explain and describe that 
information. Furthermore, images can be used to transmit information 
about phenomena during the process of conceptualisation. And, since 
scientific images are usually causally related to the object under 
investigation, they can contain non-conceptual information about the entity 
they represent. Thus we grasp such non-conceptual information through 
perception, and human observers can learn about those entities from 
images. Since non-conceptual information is acquired via perception, it also 
follows that at least some perceptual contents are not bound to concepts.  
Möβner gives the example of a bird guide with drawings devised to learn to 
recognise birds in the wild. The resemblance relations are detected in the 
experiences of the drawing and the object (the particular bird) in the visual 
field of the perceiver. This comparison, i.e. considering the similarities and 
dissimilarities between the appearance of the bird that I remember and the 
image printed in the book, makes a classification possible—in a way that 
words could not teach us. Thus by using images as teaching tools, 
resemblance relations help us to conceptualise phenomena. This non-
conceptual content of perception also explains how we are able to acquire 
observational concepts in the first place.  
The above argument implies that our visual capabilities are not restricted 
to already-conceptualised domains: our perceptual apparatus allows us to 
access non-conceptual, and thus non-propositional, content. Acknowledging 
the capacity of images to transmit non-conceptual content enables 
scientists to draw on the further merits of visual representations. Namely, 
scholars can communicate about phenomena that have not yet been 
completely conceptualised. Indeed, visual representations allow the 
elaboration of the initial concept itself.  
Möβner uses the theory of dual coding to strengthen her case, according to 
which the human brain stores information in two distinct ways: namely, 
visually and propositionally. Educational psychology suggests that 
presenting information visually is particularly helpful to students with low 
prior knowledge of the particular domain of science involved.  
The thesis is further supported by the contrast between ‘knowing-that’ and 
‘knowing-how’, i.e. theoretical vs. practical knowledge. These two types of 
knowledge also have different aims: namely, truth vs. success (at some 
activity). This puts—what Möβner calls—the ‘reductionist’ account under 
further pressure, since a subject might know all the rules (e.g. about how 
to play the piano), and still be unable to carry out the activity in question 
(viz. playing the piano): there is a ‘knowledge-of-rules-to-action-gap’. Also, 
some of the actions we perform to reach goals are not guided by rules.  
2. Critique 
Möβner argues (in my opinion, successfully) that visual representations in 
science, given an appropriate context, can store and transmit both 
propositional and non-propositional, conceptual and non-conceptual, 
knowledge. Her argument—framed as an extensive compilation of 
arguments from the literature, adding arguments of her own—is important, 
and casts light on current scientific practice: see, for example, the 
discussion of the image of the black hole with which I began.  
But I disagree with some of Möβner’s arguments; I will here mention four 
(minor) points of content, and three of structure and presentation. 
First, concerning her main thesis I just mentioned, and elsewhere: the 
abundance of quotes from the literature, which advocate very disparate 
positions, does not facilitate the clarity of Möβner’s own theses. The book’s 
discourse meanders between arguments and counter-arguments, in a way 
that sometimes makes it hard to: (a) distinguish Möβner’s own thoughts 
from those of the literature, and (b) discern the exact thesis she is arguing 
for. The text is erudite and largely written as a commentary to other 
philosophers’ work.  
This leaves us with a number of questions that do not seem to have been 
clearly addressed: What, apart from the particular examples, distinguishes 
the cases where visual representations store and transmit propositional, as 
against non-propositional, knowledge? How exactly do visual 
representations store and transmit propositional information, and what 
does the use of e.g. captions imply for the transmission of information in 
visual representations? A fuller theoretical discussion of Möβner’s own 
theses, independent of the literature, would have helped clarify the 
discussion. 
The second point concerns the literature discussed. While the book 
successfully brings together various strands of literature (some of it only 
available in German), there are obvious omissions. For example, Möβner 
emphasises that philosophers (of science) have neglected visual 
representations. But two important examples that come to mind, and which 
Möβner does not mention at all, are Galison and Daston (2007) and Kaiser 
(2005). 
Something else that seems lacking is a more pointed discussion of some of 
the semantic aspects of images, as against the epistemic aspects that 
Möβner emphasises. When speaking about translating from one 
representation to another, Möβner never specifies whether this translation 
is assumed to be merely syntactic, or also respects the semantics. Without 
a discussion of this point, it is hard to follow claims, such as those in Chapter 
3, that numeric representations of digital images are ontologically more 
basic than the images themselves. Also, one would have expected at least 
some discussion of recent work on representation in scientific theories and 
models, now only mentioned in a single footnote (see e.g. Frigg and Nguyen 
(2016)). 
Third, her claim, towards the end of Chapter 4, that visualisation is the only 
way to acquire certain types of knowledge (e.g. that the only way to learn 
to discern the different birds is using a visual field guide or similar visual 
aid), does not seem to follow.3 Although visual information, as in the case 
of the bird guide, can indeed be non-propositional, there may be other ways 
to cognize the same non-propositional knowledge, i.e. to establish the same 
biological classification (for example: by auditive means, smell or by 
employing artificial devices). Möβner is convincing when she argues that 
there is visual information that cannot be transmitted linguistically, but she 
 
3 Möβner mentions here an analogy with the Mary-argument in the philosophy of mind, but in my opinion the two 
cases are very different, since that example argues for the existence of individually perceived qualia, while the 
bird guide aims to establish an objective biological classification. 
has not argued that visualisation is the only means, and that there are no 
other non-linguistic means to transmit such information. 
Finally, the concluding Chapter (‘Outlook. New responsibilities?’) first 
summarises the findings of the book and then discusses the responsibilities 
of the agents involved (usually, the scientists). The Chapter, as an attempt 
to draw some normative conclusions, strikes me as a weak and as an 
unnecessary addition to an otherwise excellent monograph. To illustrate, 
we read things like: ‘producers and distributors of… images should take into 
account the limited abilities of their lay audience to assess visually 
presented information’, ‘visual representations are a powerful means to 
influence public opinion’, ‘scientists should handle… representational means 
thoughtfully… They should avoid the distribution of misleading images’. 
Assertions like these strike me as so common-sensical that they hardly 
require reading the rest of the monograph—the author does not make clear 
what her analysis adds to these platitudes.  
This ‘outlook’ section might have been more successful if instead it had 
pointed to the philosophical road ahead (about which one could indeed 
expect Möβner to have interesting things to say). 
My three remaining qualms about the structure and presentation of the 
book are as follows. 
First, it would have been desirable to increase the number of chapters and 
sections. Apart from brief introductory and conclusive chapters, the book 
consists of just three main Chapters, each averaging 108 pages (!). Each 
Chapter contains only two, and in one case three, main Sections (setting 
aside the Section’s summary). This makes the Chapters and Sections 
forbiddingly long.  
Second, a book about visual representations might have made better use 
of illustrations and visual cues in the text. There are a good number of 
black-and-white illustrations, but they are not all of good quality. The text 
sometimes refers to illustrations in other texts that are not included in the 
book. And more efficient use of labels, numberings, and visual cues in the 
(already very long!) text would have increased its readability.  
This leads in to my third point, about the use of summaries: each Chapter 
indeed contains a “summary”, and each Section contains a “discussion of 
interim results”. However, most of these are not, in fact, summaries at all, 
but rather further developments of the argument. They introduce new 
concepts and quote or cite new authors, so that the ‘summary’ aspect is 
often lost. Combined with the dialectic style where the author’s own voice 
is usually hidden among the voices of other authors, this reduces the 
accessibility of the book. 
My main qualms have been about structure and presentation not content—
indeed Möβner’s line of argumentation is, in my opinion, solid. The 
monograph is an important contribution to this timely topic: a must-read 
for authors who wish to write, or simply learn, about visualisation in science. 
References 
EHT Collaboration (2019). ‘First M87 Event Horizon Telescope Results. I. 
The Shadow of the Supermassive Black Hole’. The Astrophysical Journal 
Letters, 875: L1, pp. 1-28. 
EHT Collaboration (2019a). ‘First M87 Event Horizon Telescope Results. II. 
Array and Instrumentation’. The Astrophysical Journal Letters, 875: L2, pp. 
1-28. 
EHT Collaboration (2019b). ‘First M87 Event Horizon Telescope Results. III. 
Data Processing and Calibration’. The Astrophysical Journal Letters, 875: 
L3, pp. 1-32. 
EHT Collaboration (2019c). ‘First M87 Event Horizon Telescope Results. IV. 
Imaging the Central Supermassive Black Hole’. The Astrophysical Journal 
Letters, 875: L4, pp. 1-52. 
EHT Collaboration (2019d). ‘First M87 Event Horizon Telescope Results. V. 
Physical Origin of the Asymmetric Ring’. The Astrophysical Journal Letters, 
875: L5, pp. 1-31. 
EHT Collaboration (2019e). ‘First M87 Event Horizon Telescope Results. VI. 
The Shadow and Mass of the Central Black Hole’. The Astrophysical Journal 
Letters, 875: L6, pp. 1-44. 
Frege, G. (1956). ‘The Thought. A Logical Inquiry’. Mind, 65 (259), pp. 289-
311. 
Frigg, R. and Nguyen, J. (2016). ‘Scientific Representation’. Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
Galison, P. and Daston, L. (2007). Objectivity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Kaiser, D. (2005). Drawing Theories Apart. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
Plato (1997). Complete Works. Edited by John M. Cooper. 
Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. 
